

## EU's SECURITY POLICY AT THE CURRENT STAGE (2022 till the beginning of 2025)

*The thesis examines the EU's security policy after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, European security has deteriorated: Russian expansionism, hybrid influence, internal conflicts in NATO, and inconsistent US policy have destroyed the illusion of security in the EU.*

*The study found that the EU has changed its approach to security policy. Since 2022, the EU has legally enshrined as a priority to ensure the security of the Union. An internal rearmament policy is being implemented, and various programs promote cooperation within the union. Cooperation with the UN and regional countries to stabilize the situation in the region has been agreed, and EU missions have been sent to Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine to counter Russia's hybrid influence. In addition, significant financial resources were allocated to support Ukraine and sanctions were imposed on Russia to stop the war.*

**Key words:** Security policy, EU, Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukraine, Russia.

As 2025 starts, the state of global and European security is somewhat unstable and unpredictable. The war in Ukraine is entering its fourth year, and yet doesn't seem to be close to its end.

The war in Ukraine revealed the real situation inside NATO: the unity inside the organization is absent, some countries sabotage aid or sanction decisions, some oppose Ukrainian integration, some delay the aid provision. Recently, the newly-elected USA president made a statement, that he doesn't exclude the possibility of the USA leaving NATO.

In such conditions, the duty to support Ukraine in war against Russia, as well as protect Europe from different kinds of threats, is possible to depend only on the European Union and their actions. Therefore, the topic of the European Union's policy in various fields of security (and CSDP particularly) after 2022 and up until today is of particular importance not only for us, but for all the countries of Europe, including Ukraine.

*Doctrine change.* The eruption of war in Ukraine was a shock not only for Ukraine, but to the European Union as well. Acknowledging the threat that Russia possesses for Europe, the European Union adapted their security policy to withstand the future threats.

Less than a month after the invasion (in March 2022), the EU passed the Strategic Compass, which is a vision and list of objectives to fulfill till 2030. Main points of the plan included military support for Ukraine, Mission to Moldova, defense agreements with NATO, UN, African Union and non-EU countries of Europe. Some elements included the creation of rapid response teams in fields of cyber, hybrid and intelligence security, which will help to withstand the attacks in those fields more successfully [1].

In 2024 the European Council passed the Strategic Agenda for 2024-2029 - a list of priorities for common European policy. One of 3 main points is "Secure Europe": EU aims to increase its citizens security, infrastructure defense and armed forces preparation. Practically, it's meant to be implemented by military cooperation between EU countries, increase of military capacities, building of a powerful economic and production base [2].

Internationally, the EU signed security agreements with countries in Europe to stabilize the security situation in a region, as well as cooperate with countries in other regions - Asia and Africa.

*Internal security policy.* The shift in policy resulted in a rise of defense expenditures (290 billion euro in 2023, compared to 180 billion in 2021) and investments into the defense field (92 billion in 2023, compared to 8 in 2021). Till 2030, the EU plans to be only 50% dependent on external weapon purchases, by increasing weapon production in their own member-states and intra-union arms cooperation [1].

As was already stated, countries of the block aspire to cooperate with each other in fields of weapons, interoperability, supply and investments. Practically, it is carried out through multiple programs, passed by the commission of the EU for these purposes.

Permanent structured cooperation - PESCO - a platform for EU members to cooperate in military training, exercises and expertise. In 2023 they started carrying out a programme, dedicated to improvement of common military interoperability and readiness for cyber threats, infrastructure protection.

The Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) prepare the Union for marital threats by refilling the stocks and enhancing the production industry. Both programs combined spent 0,8 billion EUR for their goals.

In march 2025, president of EU Commission Ursula von der Lein proposed an initiative called Rearm Europe. The goal is to weaken the limits of the EU in fields of economy and gain more financial resources in order to

improve the defence state of the block. In particular, it would include: allowing member-states of the EU to increase defence expenditures, allowing EIB to finance the military enterprises, creating a common European saving and investment union to enhance private investments into the defence industry [5, p. 9; 12-16].

The security policy of the block goes on, as in 2024 European Commission passed several new programs – for technological and industrial competitiveness and defense technology base enhancement.

*Foreign defense policy.* To prevent further advancement of Russia inside Europe, some programs aimed to supply Ukraine.

European Peace Facility - an off-budget financing tool, set up to provide military aid for partners off-budget, thus faster. To respond to the danger of war in Ukraine,  $\frac{2}{3}$  of its long-term budget was spent in under a year. One year into the war, the EU increased the financing of EPF: initially having 5 billion EUR for 2021-2027 period, the program got additional financing, becoming 17 billion EUR in 2024. Aside from peace operations in multiple countries of Africa and Europe, the program's main activity was aimed at the support for Ukraine. Latter got a total of 10.5 billion EUR of military aid as of 2025 [5, p. 10-12].

Under the EPF, the EU also started the Military Assistance mission in Ukraine (EUMAM), an advisory mission to the latter (EUAM). EUMAM is the EU's mission to Ukraine, started in 2022, and designed to train the army recruits of Ukraine and provide both lethal and non-lethal military equipment. The program had around 200 million EUR funding. As of 2025, already 75.000 troops have been trained, which exceeded the initial goal of 15.000 [7].

The Russian-Ukrainian war also encourages European states to seek new forms of cooperation, or to act according to old mechanisms, only updating them to modern realities. We are talking about the concept of "Entente 2.0.", which received such a symbolic name as a result of the publication a joint article by the foreign ministers of France and Great Britain in "The Telegraph" in April 2024. S. Séjourné and D. Cameron expressed a common vision of the security situation in Europe, emphasizing the plan to create a new "cordial alliance" as the "Entente" was once formed, but no longer with Russia (then the Russian Empire), but against it. "Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine has been going on for three years, and it has a profound impact on European and Euro-Atlantic security. Britain and France, two founding members of NATO and the nuclear powers of Europe, bear the responsibility for encouraging the Alliance to overcome the challenges it faces. Together we can rally others to join us in overcoming them... It is as important that we do so today as it was for our predecessors, to set aside our differences and establish the lasting friendship that we celebrate now, not only as a sign of the "Entente Cordiale", but as a reflection of the "Entente" renewed", the article notes [3].

*Europe stability policy.* As a regional influencer, the EU supports the stability not only in current countries of the Union. The European Union didn't concentrate only on Ukraine, as a main and only threat. Considering Russia's influence and will to interfere, the council of EU sent missions into Moldova and Georgia.

Russia affects the situation in Moldova through the Pridnestrovie region and buys the votes in their elections. Thus, the mission was aimed to protect the country from possible hybrid interference of Russia during the elections in autumn 2024. As a result, the elections haven't been spoiled, thus the people of Moldova chose to move to the European Union by supporting Maia Sandu.

The main goal of the Georgian mission was to protect borders with Russia - in Abkhazia and South Ossetia - from possible invasion. The invasion hasn't taken place, however the elections in the end of 2024 have been falsificated. New, falsely chosen, pro russian president uses political means to forcefully stop protests [7].

Consequently, the EU has imposed sanctions for both Russia (for the war) and Georgia (for election falsification). Some experts state that after the invasion, the EU changed their initial way of sanctioning, by carrying out more comprehensive and effective sanction decisions [6].

*Conclusions.* After the eruption of a war in the east of Europe, the European Union proved to be a strong political actor and regional leader. Multiple political decisions both inside the Union and at the international arena helped to stabilize the situation in the continent and prevent more problems.

The Union's support to Ukraine helped to stabilize the frontline and prevent further advancement of Russia. In this situation the EPF proved to be an effective emergency funding tool, allowing it to rapidly provide resources in the first months of war. Multiple supply, funding and training programs, aimed to help Ukraine withstand the war, proved to be helpful, as multiple russian offensives failed.

As a regional leader, the union sent peaceful missions to Moldova and Georgia in order to prevent Russia's soft-power influence. However, a spoiled election process in Georgia resulted in a pro russian government. The EU should have sent one more mission - to protect the democracy of the elections. In this context, the sanction policy of the organization helps to pacify or weaken the aggressor.

After a year of the war, the EU accelerated the militarization policy: the union implemented various plans, programs and strategies to enhance their member-states' armies, armies' equipment and interoperability between different armies. Future plans of the organization include more reforms, aimed at strengthening the infrastructure, civil security, military production and technological base.

To sum up, after the beginning of war in 2022, the EU shifted its policy towards better security of the block and stability in a region. Various policies defended the military and hybrid attacks of Russia. At the same time, the levels of organization's stability and preparedness have gradually risen and are deemed to improve in the future.

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Олександр Чікал  
Ірина Тихоненко

### **ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКА ПОЛІТИКА БЕЗПЕКИ НА СУЧАСНОМУ ЕТАПІ (2022-ПОЧАТОК 2025 РР.)**

*Тези досліджують безпекову політику ЄС після початку повномасштабного вторгнення в Україну. З початком російсько-української війни у 2022 році європейська безпека погіршилась: російський експансіонізм, гібридний вплив, внутрішні конфлікти НАТО, непослідовність політики США зруйнували ілюзію безпеки в ЄС.*

*У результаті дослідження було виявлено, що ЄС змінив свій підхід до політики безпеки. З 2022 року ЄС законодавчо закріплено як пріоритет забезпечення безпеки союзу. Проводиться внутрішня політика переозброєння, різні програми сприяють співпраці всередині союзу. Погоджено співпрацю з ООН та країнами регіону для стабілізації ситуації в регіоні, а також відправлено місії ЄС у Молдову, Грузію та Україну для протидії гібридному впливу РФ. Крім того, було виділено значні фінансові ресурси на підтримку України і введено санкції проти РФ для зупинення війни.*

**Ключові слова:** безпекова політика, ЄС, російсько-українська війна, Україна, Росія

#### **Відомості про авторів/Information about the Authors**

Олександр Чікал, студент 3 курсу спеціальності 291 «Міжнародні відносини, суспільні комунікації та регіональні студії» Чорноморський національний університет імені Петра Могили, Миколаїв, Україна. E-mail: [oleksandr.chikal@chmnu.edu.ua](mailto:oleksandr.chikal@chmnu.edu.ua)

Oleksandr Chikal, 3rd year student of specialty 291 "International Relations, Public Communications and Regional Studies" Petro Mohyla Black Sea National University, Mykolaiv, Ukraine. E-mail: [oleksandr.chikal@chmnu.edu.ua](mailto:oleksandr.chikal@chmnu.edu.ua)

Ірина Тихоненко, канд. політ. наук, доцент кафедри міжнародних відносин та зовнішньої політики, Чорноморський національний університет імені Петра Могили, Миколаїв, Україна. E-mail: [irinavi2202@gmail.com](mailto:irinavi2202@gmail.com) ORCID <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7716-085X>

Iryna Tykhonenko, PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor of the Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Petro Mohyla Black Sea National University, Mykolaiv, Ukraine. E-mail: [irinavi2202@gmail.com](mailto:irinavi2202@gmail.com) ORCID <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7716-085X>

